Italy and the European Community: Active Defense, Not Silence
Italy & the European Community · 1981–1991
Where the US Congress cut aid and the UK left little trace, Italy did the opposite: it was Somalia's largest single donor throughout the genocide period, and its government actively defended Barre diplomatically well into 1991. The story only became fully public afterward, as a corruption scandal in Milan.
The largest donor, by far
Italy administered southern Somalia as a UN trust territory until 1960 and never fully disengaged. Documents the Italian Foreign Ministry itself submitted to Parliament show Italy sponsored 114 aid projects in Somalia between 1981 and 1990, spending more than $1 billion — at points equivalent to roughly half of Somalia's entire GNP. Journalist Wolfgang Achtner's investigation for The Washington Post found that, with few exceptions, the projects were "absurd and wasteful": a $250 million road across empty desert, a $40 million hospital Somalia couldn't staff and which fell into disrepair, a $95 million fertilizer plant that never operated, fishing boats that never went to sea.
A corrupt pipeline
Aid contracts were brokered through the Italy-Somalia Chamber of Commerce, headed by Prime Minister Bettino Craxi's brother-in-law, Paolo Pillitteri. In September 1985, Craxi became the first Italian PM to visit Somalia, promising roughly $450 million in aid; Barre was received with full honors in Rome in 1986 and 1987. A 1989 civil lawsuit alleged Craxi's circle had promised Somali officials, including future warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid, a 50-50 split of a 10% kickback on Chamber-brokered deals. Craxi and Pillitteri later became central figures in Italy's sprawling Tangentopoli corruption investigations, which implicated more than 90 politicians and businessmen.
Opposition raised, and rebuffed
Green Party MP Francesco Rutelli led parliamentary opposition to the relationship, repeatedly calling for Italian aid to be conditioned on human rights and reform. He and his allies were rebuffed each time by the coalition around Craxi. In May 1988, immediately after Barre's forces destroyed three northern cities, opposition politicians in Rome again demanded an end to the cooperation — and were again turned down. Amnesty International's detailed 1988 reports on torture and atrocities in Somalia, Rutelli later said, "had no effect on the Italian government."
Rome's relationship with Barre survived even the assassination of the Bishop of Mogadishu, Salvatore Colombo, in July 1989, and the beating death of an Italian biologist in Somali secret-service custody in June 1990. When opposition members pressed the point in Parliament, Socialist Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis gave an answer that became infamous:
As late as January 1991, days before Barre was finally forced to flee Mogadishu, De Michelis was still trying to persuade rebel representatives in Rome that any political transition should include the old dictator.
The European Community: no mechanism to act even if it wanted to
Beyond Italy's bilateral role, the European Community's own aid framework offered no lever at all during this period. The Lomé Convention, which governed EC aid to Somalia and dozens of other African, Caribbean, and Pacific states, was built from its first iteration (1975) on a principle of political neutrality: aid was explicitly meant to come free of political conditions. That didn't change until Lomé IV, signed 15 December 1989 — more than a year and a half after the worst of the killing, and even then the new human-rights clause (Article 5) came with no enforcement mechanism. No European Parliament resolution on Somalia from 1988–1990 could be found in this research, though the Parliament was actively passing resolutions on other African and human-rights topics in the same years.
Sources
- Wolfgang Achtner, "The Italian Connection: How Rome Helped Ruin Somalia," The Washington Post (24 Jan 1993) Investigative piece based on documents submitted to the Italian Parliament by its own Foreign Ministry; details $1B+ in aid across 114 projects, the Craxi-Pillitteri corruption scheme, and Rome's diplomatic defense of Barre into 1991. https://sii1991.org/how-italy-aided-in-the-ruin-of-somalia-fighting-snm/
- "Human Rights and the Lomé Convention: Debates between the European Community and the Developing World, 1988–91" (academic article) Explains that Lomé III, in force throughout the genocide period, was built on a principle of political neutrality with no human rights conditions; Article 5 human rights language was not added until Lomé IV, signed 15 Dec 1989. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/396755569_Human_Rights_and_the_Lome_Convention_Debates_between_the_European_Community_and_the_Developing_World_1988-91